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ABSTRACT: This Note explores wives' lawsuits in response to male
drunkenness between 1850 and 1910. These suits were notable in part because
of the existing common law rule of coverture that denied a woman's legal
existence during marriage. The Note argues that prior to the major waves of
temperance reform in the twentieth century, American courts devised creative
legal solutions providing relief to wives that reflected the courts' desire to
achieve a socially accepted balance between protecting women and upholding
male authority within the family. It finds that the courts shaped dram shop,
divorce, and dower remedies both to address the incapacity of drunken
husbands and to protect male privilege to a certain extent. While scholars have
studied how men enjoyed immunities from prosecution for chastisement, they
have not explored the historical civil remedies available to wives for male
addiction to alcohol.
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INTRODUCTION
The early American temperance movement of the mid-to-late 1800s, which
started addressing the excessive use of alcohol prior to major waves of social
reform, reflected judicial recognition of wives who needed legal remedies to
financially sustain their families. This Note will explore the nature of early
wives' lawsuits in response to male drunkenness-the legal processes, causes
of action, and types of judgment handed down by the courts under state and
local statutes. These women's lawsuits constituted a relatively new
phenomenon in the 1800s. This Note argues that the resulting creative legal
solutions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reflected the
courts' desire to strike a socially approved balance between protecting women
and upholding male authority.
Into the early 1900s, courts strived to protect the privacy of the family.
Previously, legal scholars and historians explored the state and local courts'
responses to chastisement (domestic corporal punishment), generally agreeing
that even after courts repudiated a husband's right to chastise his wife, men
enjoyed immunities from prosecution for domestic abuse so that courts could
protect the privacy of the family.I This Note contextualizes this consensus
1. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117, 2118 (1996). See also ALICE CRARY, BEYOND MORAL JUDGMENT 172-74 (2007)
(describing domestic violence and its contributions to social mechanisms that keep women in a
structurally inferior position); SHOSHANA FELMAN, THE JURIDICAL UNCONSCIOUS: TRIALS AND
TRAUMAS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 202 n.39 (2002) (citing Siegel in support of the
argument that American courts treated wife-beating differently from other cases of assault and
battery); ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT xiii (2004) (discussing Siegel's
analysis of chastisement in support of Pleck's own argument about the family ideal as a barrier to
intervention in family violence); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL
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concerning the importance of familial privacy within the phenomenon of
women attempting to obtain financial relief for the incapacity of their drunken
husbands between 1850 and 1910. Essentially, courts acknowledged that
married women depended on their husbands for their familial livelihoods and
had legal rights to bring suits when their husbands failed to provide on account
of drunkenness. Yet, the courts construed the suits and remedies in ways that
managed to protect male privilege to a certain degree. Legal literature on
women's rights has analyzed the way the common law privacy doctrine gave
immunity to men in domestic relationship suits during this era. Scholars,
however, have overlooked the fact that in the context of domestic temperance
cases during a similar time period, courts did permit women to make inroads in
the American legal system. Courts in this gendered society recognized wives'
lawsuits and provided them with modest forms of relief through dram shop
liability, divorce, and dower rights.
Up until the mid-1800s, married women were severely limited by the law
in contract, property, and court procedures in terms of what suits they could
2bring and what relief they could receive, if any at all. The common law of
coverture, carried over from Great Britain to the North American colonies, had
established that a wife and her husband were one person under the law.3
Prominent English jurist William Blackstone noted that the legal existence of
women was essentially suspended during marriage, which resulted in married
women having no title in property and in an absence of women in colonial
American court records.4 In the 1800s, a number of states began passing
legislation in the form of what were called "Married Women's Property Acts. "
The acts permitted married women to own property to increase familial
economic security.5 Furthermore, as a result of the growth of cities, increased
industrialization, more widespread education, and increased leisure time,
women gained the resources necessary to begin effectively mobilizing for their
own benefit by the 1870s.6 At this time, however, a significant number of
American women were still ineligible to vote, excluded from the political party
JUSTICE 347 n.9 (2011) (citing Siegel in support of her analysis of the state of the chastisement
doctrine after the Civil War).
2. Mary Beth Norton, "Either Married or to Bee Married": Women's Legal Inequality in Early
America, in INEQUALITY IN EARLY AMERICA 25, 26-27 (Carla Gardina Pestana & Sharon V. Salinger
eds., 1999).
3. Albert Venn Dicey, Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England
During the Nineteenth Century 371-88 (2d ed. 1914), reprinted in JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW
LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 355 (2009).
4. Norton, supra note 2, at 26-27. Historian Mary Beth Norton notes that in the colonial era, "wives
composed less than two fifths of all female civil litigants in either New England or the Chesapeake, even
though the vast majority of adult women in the colonies were married at any given time." Id. at 27.
5. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS IN
AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790-1920, at 162-69 (2005).
6. RUTH BORDIN, WOMAN AND TEMPERANCE: THE QUEST FOR POWER AND LIBERTY, 1873-1900,
at 12 (1981).
2015] 143
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
system, and constrained by the "ideology of domesticity." 7 Yet American
wives needed some way to address the intoxication of their husbands and sons
that was seriously threatening their home lives. After the Civil War, in the
midst of the energy of the grassroots women's rights movement but prior to the
burgeoning of the suffragist campaign in the early 1900s, wives resorted to the
courts to gain financial relief for the excesses of their drunken husbands. In
attempting to protect their family lives, they asserted their legal rights in the
process. By focusing on the drunken and wasteful behavior of husbands, the
early temperance court cases allowed women to earn a place in the courtroom
in their own right. Wives' lawsuits in the emerging temperance context focused
on dram shop liability, separation from bed and board, complete divorce, and
dower claims.
These types of relief varied in scope. Dram shop statutes held alcohol
sellers liable for injuries or damages to a third person resulting from such sales.
Wives burdened financially by their drunken spouses could therefore bring suit
against bar and saloon owners for providing alcohol to their husbands.
Although historians have a picture of how family law worked in the nineteenth
century, dram shop liability led to a different category of cases that were more
favorable to women. The dram shop cases expanded women's legal rights by
giving them a new cause of action and allowing them to receive significant
damages. Separation from bed and board and complete divorce in the
temperance context involved another group of cases in which judges were
sympathetic to wives' plight. Courts granted both types of divorce but preferred
separation from bed and board because it preserved the marriage relationship.
Dower rights, another type of relief, traditionally allowed a widow to retain a
one-third share in her husband 's estate. 9 The temperance cases involving dower
are noteworthy because courts sometimes permitted wives to obtain dower in
unconventional circumstances, such as if they lived separately from their
husbands or prior to a husband's death.
The next section of this Note, Part I, contextualizes the temperance
movement by noting that alcohol played a large part in destabilizing American
households between 1850 and 1910. Partly due to a lack of strong federal or
state rehabilitation programs, this problem spiraled out of control.
Part II discusses how, given this increased level of husband drunkenness,
women sought remedies within the legal system to address their financial
distress, primarily through dram shop statute actions. Courts looked favorably
upon dram shop suits, since enforcing the statutes did not require breaking the
7. THOMAS R. PEGRAM, BATTLING DEMON RUM: THE STRUGGLE FOR A DRY AMERICA, 1800-
1933, at 44 (1998).
8. Id. at 44-45.
9. JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (6th ed. rev.
1856), http://www.constitution.org/bouv/bouvierd.htm.
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sacred marriage relationship. In line with their preference for dram shop suits,
the courts only imposed on plaintiff-wives the low burden of proof of witness
testimony as to husband drunkenness.
Part III then looks at two other types of wives' suits, divorce a mensa et
thoro (separation from bed and board) and divorce a vinculo matrimonii
(complete divorce). Courts preferred to grant divorce a mensa et thoro to wives
over divorce a vinculo matrimonii, likely because separation from bed and
board left open the possibility of future reconciliation between the husband and
wife.10 Complete divorce was perceived of as a threat to the established female
and male spheres within the marriage institution. In complete divorce cases,
the courts imposed a higher and stricter burden of proof on the plaintiff-wives
to show habitual intemperance that developed after marriage. This burden was
sometimes even placed on plaintiff-husbands who filed for divorce. 12
Part IV describes how courts sometimes chose to shape dower rights to
accommodate women with drunken husbands. In a few states, a wife could
retain her share in her husband's estate even if they lived separately, the
husband assigned her dower rights away while he was drunk, or she remarried.
Although dower was usually granted to wives when their husbands died, at
least one situation involving a drunken husband induced a court to practice
leniency towards the plaintiff-wife. For example, in a particular case, the
Supreme Court of Nebraska went against legal tradition and held that a wife's
right to dower could accrue immediately at the time of divorce, not just at the
time of her husband's death.13
The prevailing political and legal attitude that women and men occupied
separate spheres within the sacred institution of marriage restricted wives' suits
and courts' decisions. However, the mere fact that women were judicially
permitted to stand as plaintiffs was a revolutionary outgrowth of the early
American temperance movement. Many of the cases cited in this Note are from
Midwestern America; the legislative trend in favor of temperance originated
predominantly in that region of the United States in the 1800s.14 The Note ends
with the acknowledgement that the temperance movement eventually
10. Divorce a mensa et thoro separated the husband and wife but did not dissolve the marriage;
neither party was permitted to remarry. JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION (6th ed. rev. 1856), http://www.constitution.org/bouv/bouvier a.htm.
I1. Nineteenth-century author and attorney David Stewart noted that through marriage a man and
woman discharge their particular duties towards society and each other and that "[marriage is the]
[u]nion of one man and one woman so long as they shall both live ... by an obligation which, during
that life-time, the parties cannot of their own volition or act dissolve, but which can be dissolved only by
the authority of the State." DAVID STEWART, THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 3-4 (1887).
12. See infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
13. Tatro v. Tatro, 25 N.W. 571, 573 (Neb. 1885).
14. Dramshop Acts, LEGAL DICTIONARY-THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Dramshop+Acts (last visited Mar. 16, 2015) (stating that the first dram
shop act was passed in Illinois in 1872).
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transformed into a constitutional issue championed by women as a statement of
their rights.
Courts approached these habitual drunkenness cases between 1850 and
1910 with the view that suffering wives were simultaneously financially needy
and constrained domestic actors. In the nineteenth century, state and local
courts fashioned remedies for women who desperately needed money and
assets to support their families. Courts took on this initiative as men shirked
their civil responsibilities through habitual drunkenness. However, the women
who sought relief were also limited by the courts' conception of male privilege.
Regardless, the fact that women could bring suits themselves demonstrated a
societal step towards greater gender equality.
I. ALCOHOLISM, DOMESTIC INSTABILITY, AND ABSENCE OF STATE
INTERVENTION
A. Male Alcoholism: Financial and Social Insecurity in the Home
The prominence of alcohol in nineteenth century America cannot be
overstated.15 Alcohol was considered a cheap and staple food, beverage, and
drug, and the number of saloons increased dramatically following the Civil
War.16 In fact, in the 1880s and 1890s, there was about one saloon for every
fifty males over fifteen years of age in the working-class areas of American
cities.17
By the late 1800s, American society generally acknowledged the negative
effects of drunkenness on family and community relations. The Detroit Free
Press reported in 1883 that the "liquor men are now more defiant and more
numerous.. . . They work their criminal mills openly in the face of all, and we
see the streams of vice and crime pouring forth from these sources to lay waste
the community . . . . " As a result, there were attempts to pass and enforce
regulatory and early prohibition laws to rein in the effects of the rampant
alcohol abuse. In attorney E.A. Whitman's 1893 account of Massachusetts
temperance reform, he describes the passage of a no-license law for alcohol in
15. See generally DAVID S. REYNOLDS, WAKING GIANT: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF JACKSON
(2009) (describing, in part, the amount of American liquor consumption in the 1820s). In his article
Alcohol in America, W. J. Rorabaugh discusses how drinking alcohol was considered an important
part of American culture, with alcohol consumed at almost every meal. After the American
Revolution, the British refused to supply rum and the American government began to tax it in the
1790s. Com became plentiful in Kentucky and Ohio, resulting in the greater production of whiskey
that sold for a cheap twenty-five cents a gallon by the 1820s. Whiskey was also considered safer
than the often-contaminated drinking water. W. J. Rorabaugh, Alcohol in America, 5 OAH MAG.
HIST. 17, 17 (1991).
16. BORDIN, supra note 6, at 5-6.
17. Id.at6.
18. The Temperance Outlook, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 30, 1883, at 4.
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Cambridge. According to Whitman, a firm of coppersmiths in Cambridge
remarked that after the closing of the saloons, men "save money and have an
account in the savings-bank who never did so before."l9 Society and, more
specifically, wives grew increasingly concerned about male drunkenness and
focused on the practical reality of needing men to provide for their families.
B. The Lack ofReform-Oriented State Programs: Courts as a Resource
Prior to the Prohibition era, government-sponsored programs or initiatives
to combat alcoholism were either scarce or did not gain much popularity.
Private organizations and calls to action had existed since the 1700s but only
gained some traction in the mid-i 800s.20 A limited number of alcohol recovery
programs did exist, but they lacked longevity or widespread public approval.21
The New York State Inebriate Asylum, essentially a hospital for alcoholics and
the first of its kind, opened in 1864 to treat alcoholism and other drugs, but by
the last decade of the nineteenth century such homes and asylums were
closing.22 The New York State Inebriate Asylum itself was converted to an
Asylum for the Chronic Insane in 1879.23
In the interim, there was a growing concern with the dangers of alcohol and
a number of private efforts were made to address this problem. The American
Association for the Cure of Inebriety was founded in 1870 and brought to light
the dangers of alcohol through its Journal of Inebriety, published from 1876 to
1914.24 That same decade, mutual aid societies, like the addiction recovery
Ribbon Reform Clubs, came to life, and the religious urban mission movement
began to grow.25 One mutual aid society, the Keeley League, conceived of
drunkenness as a medical disease and created a sanitarium for drunkards,
framing the issue of alcoholism as one requiring therapy rather than legal
19. E.A. WHITMAN, THECAMBRIDGEIDEA INTEMPERANCEREFORM 18 (1893).
20. For more information on influential American physician Benjamin Rush's push for treatment of
drunkenness in the late 1700s and his call in 1810 for the establishment of sober houses designed to treat
alcoholics, see Mark S. Gold and Christine Adamec, Dr. Benjamin Rush and His Views on Alcoholism,
ARMENIAN MEDICAL NETWORK, http://www.health.am/psy/more/dr-benjamin-rush-and-his-views-on-
alcoholism/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2014). For a discussion of private mutual aid societies, like the
Washington Society (which predated Alcoholics Anonymous and focused on sobriety), see generally
William L. White, Pre-A.A. Alcoholic MutualAidSocieties, 19 ALCoHoLIsM TREATMENT Q. 1 (2001).
21. For a brief discussion of how very few public inebriate asylums were actually established in
America between 1840 and 1870, see also Jim Baumohl, Inebriate Institutions in North America, 1840-
1920, 85 BRIT. J. ADDICTION 1187, 1189 (1990).
22. Significant Events in the History of Addiction Treatment and Recovery in America,
SELECTED PAPERS OF WILLIAM WHITE 2, 4,
http://www.williamwhitepapers.com/pr/AddictionTreatment&RecoveryInAmerica.pdf (last visited
Apr. 19, 2014) [hereinafter Significant Events].
23. New York State Inebriate Asylum Binghamton, LANDMARKS OF NEW YORK STATE,
http://nyslandmarks.com/southemtier/bing001.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
24. Significant Events, supra note 22, at 2-3.
25. Id. at 3.
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punishment.26 By the early 1900s, private "drying out" hospitals had become
another phenomenon.27 One of the more disturbing movements was the
sterilization of alcoholics and other undesirable groups.28 A number of
physicians in the 1880s pointed to hereditary factors to explain alcoholism and
other social and medical problems, resulting in the passage of a few state laws
promoting a eugenics movement. 29
Other than these limited programs and the emerging state temperance
statutes, though, neither the federal government nor the states vigorously
stepped in to reform drunken men during this period.30 As a result, women took
to the courts for relief in the midst of these weak initiatives. As the temperance
issue rose to the forefront of the social and political agenda due to the activity
of these private organizations and individual reformers, states began to pass
stronger prohibition-oriented laws. By the second decade of the twentieth
century, the movement had coalesced into a nationwide constitutional
concern.32 This eventually resulted in the ratification of the federal Eighteenth
Amendment that implemented the prohibition on the manufacture, sale, and
transportation of alcohol.33 Between 1850 and 1910, however, the federal
government was relatively silent on temperance, and state laws were in the
early stages of development. It is highly likely that wives found smaller claims
in state and local courts under civil damage, divorce, and dower laws
promising, in that they could assert their legal rights and receive relief in a
quick and reliable manner.
C. Gendered Duties and Civil Remedies for Husband Drunkenness
The societal conception of marriage as a relationship with strictly defined
and gendered duties was the basis of the courts' approach to providing legal
remedies for women with drunken husbands. Marriage was legally understood
26. George A. Barclay, The Keeley League, 57 J. ILL. ST. HIST. Soc'Y 341, 344-45 (1964).
27. Significant Events, supra note 22, at 4.
28. Philip R. Reilly, Involuntary Sterilization in the United States: A Surgical Solution, 62 Q.
REv. BIOLOGY 153, 153-54 (1987).
29. Id.
30. See Baumohl, supra note 21, at 1187-89 (noting that many temperance organizations were
urban, private, and charitable and that the few specialized public institutions that existed were either
closed or converted to other uses by 1919).
3 1. See National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Use, History of Alcohol Prohibition,
SCHAFFER LIBRARY OF DRUG POLICY, http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/library/studies/nc/nc2a.htm
(last visited Feb. 23, 2015) (identifying Maine, Delaware, Ohio, Illinois, Rhode Island, Minnesota,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and New York as states that managed to pass prohibition
laws during or after the 1840s; but noting that a number of these laws were vetoed by governors,
repealed by state legislatures, or invalidated by state supreme courts).
32. Rorabaugh, s up ra note 15, at 18 (1991) (discussing the growth of the Anti-Saloon
League after 1900, the efforts of prohibitionists in 1917 to persuade Congress to pass a temporary
wartime dry law, and the subsequent ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1920).
33. U.S. CONsT. amend. XVIII.
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at the time to be a "contract, made in due form of law, by which a man and
woman reciprocally engage to live with each other . .. and to discharge toward
each other the duties imposed by law on the relation of husband and wife. "34
This legal definition, cited in an 1889 handbook on the legal implications of
marriage, alludes to the prevailing attitude at the time that a husband was
expected to work outside the home and provide financial support for his family.
Relatedly, the wife 's responsibility was to occupy the domestic sphere and tend
to the husband and children. Essentially, a husband and wife were "bound
together in a peculiar manner, with special obligations and rights with regard to
each other. "35
A husband and wife were parties to their marriage contract and were
societally expected to carry out their duties. Feminist legal scholar Catherine
MacKinnon asserts that the family "serves . . . as a site for women to gain
access to the material benefits of a man 's income. "36 The "husband has a duty
to support his wife, [and] that she has a duty to render services in the home. "
It was an established norm by 1885 that a husband was bound to support his
wife and could not charge her estate with expenses for her support. A wife
could indirectly or directly-by suit-enforce his obligation.39 In return, a
wife's obligations included surrendering her personalty, earnings, and labor to
her husband.40
During the political and legal lull between the abolitionist and mainstream
suffragist movements, wives chose to exercise and test the available legal
options that would directly allow them to recover for the drunken excesses of
their husbands. As historian Ruth Bordin argues, "Since drink was seen to
present a threat to the home, both men and women perceived temperance as a
woman 's issue.' A Women bore the brunt of male unproductivity within the
home. Consequently, one can find proof in court dockets of women airing their
grievances regarding male drunkenness.
Women began to champion the temperance movement on the grounds that
they desired to reform their misbehaving husbands and recover the
consequently lost financial support.42 In the diary of attorney A.B. Richmond,
34. LELIA J. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE: COMPILED FOR POPULAR USE 8
(1889).
35. DAVID STEWART, THE LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE: AS ESTABLISHED IN ENGLAND AND THE
UNITED STATES 3 (1885).
36. CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 647 (2d ed. 2007).
37. 1 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 423 (2d
ed. 1987).
38. STEWART, supra note 35, at 88.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. BORDIN, supra note 6, at 4-5.
42. Carolyn B. Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention in the American West and
Australia, 1860-1930, 86 IND. L.J. 185, 194 (2011). See BARBARA LESLIE EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF
DOMESTICITY: WOMEN, EVANGELISM, AND TEMPERANCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 102
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published in 1883, he laments that there are "thousands of poor wives and
mothers in our land who, with enfeebled health and weak hands, are made to do
the labor of the slave to support their little families, while the husbands and
fathers, drunken and debauched, are spending all they can earn in the licensed
rum-shop. Hence, women began using civil liability to recapture the
household income they lost or would have gained had their husbands not fallen
prey to alcoholism.
These remedies were shaped by the gendered social ideology of the time.
Coverture had long established that men had legal dominance over their wives,
and while responsibility lay with men, courts were reluctant to fully target the
culpable husbands.44 Dram shop statutes bypassed direct husband liability and
made sellers and the landlords of the sellers pay sizable damages to wives who
had suffered financially as their husbands and sons succumbed to alcoholism. 45
Wives also brought separation from bed and board suits on the ground of a
46husband's habitual drunkenness during this time period. These types of cases,
however, seem to have been brought less frequently-a type of intermediate
suit between seeking third-party damages and achieving an absolute divorce. 47
In complete divorce and dower suits, courts struggled the most with balancing
the need to financially compensate suffering wives with protecting male
privilege within the family unit.48 Between 1850 and 1910, courts retained
greater discretion over such suits. 49 Judges constructed legal hurdles that they
seemingly hoped would dissuade women from bringing temperance-related
lawsuits or would make it less likely that wives would be able to prevail.50 Yet,
the reality that wives were even permitted to bring these suits in court-and
received relief in many instances-was a legal and social revolution in itself.
II.THIRD-PARTY LIABILITY: DRAM SHOP STATUTES AND HUSBAND
MISCONDUCT
Dram shop claims were the popular means by which women brought suits
in their own name in the temperance context. By 1874, a number of states had
(1981) (noting that temperance crusaders claimed that household conflict and wife-beating were
caused by alcohol abuse).
43. A. B. RICHMOND, INTEMPERANCE AND CRIME: LEAVES FROM THE DIARY OF AN OLD LAWYER
354 (1883).
44. Norton, supra note 2, at 26-27, 29 (describing coverture and noting that a wife had to rely on
her husband to "file suits on her behalf or to defend her from legal attack" and that "wives' submerged
legal identity largely denied them access to the fruits of their own labor and enriched their husbands.").
45. See infra Part II, notes 51-65, and accompanying text (discussing dram shop liability).
46. See infra Part III (discussing separation from bed and board suits).
47. See infra Part III.A, notes 91-97, and accompanying text (making references to the rarity of
separation from bed and board suits in comparison to complete divorce suits).
48. See infra Parts Ill, IV, notes 100-128, 137-150, and accompanying text.
49. See infra Parts III, IV, notes 100-128, 137-150, and accompanying text.
50. See infra Parts 1II, IV, notes 100-128, 137-150, and accompanying text.
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enacted dram shop laws that held alcohol sellers responsible for damages due to
the effects of their alcohol traffic; the first one was supposedly enacted by
51Wisconsin in 1850. State newspaper reports and court cases describe how
wives brought suits under these statutes to recover damages from third-party
alcohol sellers-not their husbands-for pecuniary harms resulting from their
husbands' alcohol abuse. The Chicago Tribune reported in February of 1871
that the "widow of a physician [recently] recovered $1,500 damages [sic]
against the liquor seller who had plied her husband with whiskey until he sank
into a drunkard's grave, leaving her, in rags and beggary, to support herself and
wretched orphans. "52 Such a recovery was made possible by the temperance
law of Ohio that was being tested out at the time, which ordered in part that
every
husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person, who
shall be injured in person, property, or means of support, by any
intoxicated person, or in consequence of such intoxication . . . shall
have a right of action against both the person who sold the liquor and
the landlord who owns the premises on which the sale was made.53
The law further provided that wives could recover both actual and
exemplary damages, with damages above $200 to be sought in the circuit
courts. 54 In Illinois in 1886, wives were also permitted to proceed jointly and
severally against all defendants who provided intoxicating liquors to their
husbands.55 The Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District found in Buckworth
v. Crawford that the wife had "satisfactorily shown" that her husband
"acquired settled habits of intoxication, squandered and wasted his estate,
neglected his business and mistreated the plaintiff, so that she was compelled to
leave home on several occasions. "56 In this case, the Illinois Dram Shop Act
51. See D. LEIGH COLVIN, PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES: A HISTORY OF THE PROHIBITION
PARTY AND OF THE PROHIBITION MOVEMENT 25 (1926) (stating that the first civil damage act was
enacted by Wisconsin in 1850 and that similar civil damage acts were passed in a number of states); J. E.
STEBBINS & T. A. H. BROWN, FIFTY YEARS' HISTORY OF THE TEMPERANCE CAUSE 296-297 (1876)
(noting in 1874 that this civil damage system had its origins in Massachusetts, and that Delaware,
Illinois, and West Virginia had adopted similar standards); see also Thomas R. Hoecker, Illinois Dram
Shop Act. The Effect of the 1971 Amendment, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 466, 466 (1974) (noting that dram shop
statutes, in force in eighteen states in 1974, were the products of the temperance movement of the
1800s); James F. Mosher, Dram Shop Liability and the Prevention of Alcohol Related Problems, 40 J.
STUD. ON ALCOHOL 773, 773 (1979) (stating that dram shop liability was introduced in America by
temperance advocates in the mid-1800s).
52. The Temperance Law of Ohio, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 1871, at 0-2.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Buckworth v. Crawford, 24 Ill. App. 603, 604 (1886).
56. Id.
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allowed the wife to hold the two defendants who plied her husband with liquor
jointly and severally liable for the $350 verdict in her favor.57
The statutory history of Illinois paints a clear picture of the general utility
of dram shop statutes to wives with drunken husbands. These statutes held
alcohol sellers liable for injuries or damages to a third person resulting from the
sale of alcohol in certain contexts. A glance at Illinois personal injury cases
reveals that the majority of suits brought by wives under the Illinois Dram Shop
Act-which targeted the seller of intoxicating liquors, not the drunk
husbands-went in favor of the female plaintiffs.5 The courts even ordered
exemplary damages and imposed joint and several liability.59 This occurred
with particular frequency when the courts found that the plaintiffs had
60
expressly instructed the sellers not to supply their husbands with alcohol.
A. Results: Plaintiff- Wife Standing and Significant Damages
The courts' objective behind these dram shop statutes was primarily to
restore a wife 's means of support without directly holding husbands
responsible. Ellsworth v. Cummins, though a slightly different strain of case
because the drunkard was a son, illustrates this point. Mary Cummins brought
suit in her name against four defendants for selling liquor to her minor son and
making him a habitual drunk against her advisement; her husband was in jail
and provided no income for the family. The jury determined that since the
sellers had willfully violated the law relating to damages for loss of support, the
court would affirm Mrs. Cummins 's award of $975, considering lost income
and including exemplary damages.62
It is important to note that through exemplary damages, the court
recognized that punishment, not mere compensation, was necessary to deter
alcohol sellers from supplying the beverage to husbands to the detriment of
family life. As described in the New York Daily Times in 1856, "Every dram
less sold saves so much money and so much misery. And the chance of thus
diminishing ... the quantity of liquor drank, the number of wives and children
starved and bruised, the number of men maddened and brought to ruin, ought
not to be abandoned . . . ,,63 In Ohio, it appears that such a deterrence-oriented
approach worked. The Chicago Tribune reported in 1871 that landlords became
57. Id. at 603-04.
58. RODOLPHUS WAITE JOSLYN, PERSONAL INJURY CASES, ILLINOIS: INCLUDING CASES UNDER
DRAM-SHOP ACT AND ASSAULT AND BATTERY 132-40 (1908).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Ellsworth v. Cummins, 134 Ill. App. 397, 398-99 (1907).
62. Id. at 398-400.
63. Temperance Movements, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, Dec. 13, 1856, at 4.
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more astute observers of their renters.64 They began offering to cancel back
rent payments if saloons would stop selling liquor to women's husbands and
widow 's sons so that the landlords themselves could avoid being sued by
injured wives.65
B. Courts' Preference for Dram Shop Statute Claims: A Lighter Burden of
Proof
For the most part, courts in various states construed the dram shop statutes
in favor of wives. Women shouldered a lesser legal burden in these cases when
compared to burdens on wives in divorce suits.
A number of cases illustrate the low burden of proof wives had to meet in
order to receive relief under dram shop statutes. In Nebraska in 1894, plaintiff
Mary Sawyer sued for damages from saloonkeepers whom she had personally
66instructed not to sell intoxicating drinks and liquors to her husband. Her
husband's
health became greatly impaired and his family were reduced to very
destitute circumstances; that he was forced to mortgage, and finally
sell most of his stock and other necessary equipments for carrying on
his work and thereby leaving himself without proper means for the
support of his family and for carrying on the farming business in
67
which he was engaged ....
In this case, even though there was a significant question as to whether the
drowning of her husband was an actual consequence of his intoxication, the
court rendered a verdict for the plaintiffs for $1,500.68 In fact, the relevant
Nebraska statute provided that "[i]t shall be lawful for any married woman, or
any other person at her request, to institute and maintain, in her own name, a
suit on any such bond for all damages sustained by herself and children on
account of such [alcohol] traffic. ,69 The only evidence necessary, as indicated
in Section 18 of the statute, was proof that "the defendant has given or sold
64. The Temperance Law of Ohio, supra note 52. This convention also took hold in Elgin,
Illinois. In April of 1882, plaintiff Mrs. Naughten brought suit against Elgin saloonkeepers and the
saloon landlords for $5,000 in damages for the death of her intoxicated husband who fell off a moving
train. The newspaper noted that it "is probable a verdict for the plaintiff will be found." The verdict
does not seem to have been recorded. The Dram-Shop Law, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 30, 1882, at 9.
65. The Temperance Law of Ohio, supra note 52.
66. Chmelir v. Sawyer, 60 N.W. 547, 548 (Neb. 1894).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 548, 550-51.
69. Id. at 549.
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intoxicating drinks to such person during the period of such disqualification"
from daily activities, due to intoxication. 70
Some state courts did not require the plaintiffs in these dram shop statute
cases to meet a particularly high burden of proof. Accordingly, wives were
likely to prevail in many instances. The Chicago Tribune reported in the 1880s
that no "notification need be given to a saloonkeeper as to a person's habits."72
The consumer could be sober or a stranger at the time of purchase, but the
seller may still be liable if he sells alcohol to any person who is in the habit of
becoming intoxicated.73 In addition, the same act provided that a plaintiff need
only provide the testimony of witnesses detailing that they had frequently seen
the consumer under the influence of alcohol in order to prove the habit of
intoxication. 74 Similarly, a jury in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found
that plaintiff Mary Hemp, whose husband received intoxicating beverages from
H.A. Mardorf's tavern after Mrs. Hemp had given the tavern owner written
notice not to sell to her husband, had met the low burden of proof of witness
testimony; the court suggested that the jury find the maximum of $500 in
damages. 75 The court's decision was based mainly on Mrs. Hemp's own
testimony that Mr. Hemp had not been a habitual drinker prior to the
establishment of Mardorf's tavern. 76
Judges were generally willing to absolve the plaintiffs of an extra burden of
producing large amounts of evidence in court under the dram shop statutes. For
instance, Chief Justice Horton of the Kansas Supreme Court asserted in Jockers
v. Borgman that even though a plaintiff-wife had assisted the defendant in
obtaining a liquor license, "she did not authorize him to barter, sell, or give
intoxicants to her husband or any other person in violation of the statute, nor by
so acting did she consent that he might injure her in person or property, or
means of support, by intoxicating her husband. " Furthermore, the court chose
to sidestep the possibility that the plaintiff had consumed alcohol with her
husband or encouraged him to drink in the years prior to the commencement of
her action. 78 It decided instead to focus on how the intoxicated husband left the
70. Id.
71. See infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text; see also Jockers v. Borgman, 29 Kan. 109, 118
(1883) (describing the case in such a way that it is implied that a plaintiff who had brought the suit in
Kansas would not have to prove that she herself had not encouraged her husband's alcoholic habits);
A. Reader & A. Paxton, The Dram-Shop Act: A Correspondent's Questions Answered, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 19, 1885, at 6 (implying that a wife in Illinois would not have to prove in court that she had
notified the accused saloonkeeper that her husband had alcoholic tendencies and would just need to
provide witness testimony).
72. Reader & Paxton, supra note 71.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Mardorf v. Hemp, 6 A. 754, 754-755 (Pa. 1886).
76. Id.
77. Jockers v. Borgman, 29 Kan. 109, 118 (1883).
78. Id. at 116,118.
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wife and family with little food, few clothes, and no male support. 79 The court
interpreted the dram shop statute at the center of the Jockers case to provide for
both $1,000 in compensatory damages and $400 in punitive damages because
the wife had notified the liquor seller not to sell to her husband and the seller
proceeded to do so anyway.so
Generally speaking, American society in the mid-to-late 1800s remained
shaped by the lingering ideology of separate spheres for men and women as
well as coverture. The Social Gospel movement of the twentieth century, which
examined social justice issues through a Protestant Christian lens, viewed the
marital system of the 1800s as based on wives' responsibility to marry, bear
children, and serve the home for the benefit of their husbands. Under this
perspective emphasizing the legal dominance of men and the domestic role of
women, it appears that wives had better chances of victory when proceeding
not against their own husbands but against outside saloons and taverns that
acquired the profits from alcohol sales. It is possible that courts honored
women 's suits against liquor sellers because the third parties were disrupting
family life and had the capability to pay damages.
C. The Limits ofDram Shop Liability
Despite the low burden that American courts established for winning dram
shop liability suits, the courts could still be unpredictable when considering
dram shop statute remedies. It appears that the state courts sometimes refrained
from awarding very large damages. In Chmelir v. Sawyer, the plaintiff believed
she was entitled to $10,000 in damages after calculating her husband's lost
earnings and the needs of her family, but she was only awarded about one-tenth
of the requested amount.82 In addition, in certain instances, courts ruled against
the legal current and found reason to blame the women for their circumstances.
A wife in Illinois was denied $1,000 in damages because the court determined
that although her husband had gone to bed with a purchased jug of liquor, the
wife was negligent in not taking away the jug.8
Non-commercial alcohol providers generally escaped liability. For
example, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Illinois dram shop act that
ordered a fine and imprisonment of those who sell or give intoxicating liquor to
a habitual drunkard does not apply to someone who provides alcohol to his
79. Id.
80. Id.at 111, 121.
81. Janet F. Fishbum, Walter Rauschenbusch and "The Woman Movement": A Gender
Analysis, in GENDER AND THE SOCIAL GOSPEL 73 (Wendy J.D. Edwards & Carolyn D.S. Gifford eds.,
2003).
82. 60 N.W. 547, 548 (Neb. 1894).
83. JOSLYN, supra note 58, at 136.
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friend in his private home as an act of courtesy.8 4 The Appellate Court of
Illinois, Fourth District accordingly ruled in 1887 that the legislature did not
intend Section 9 of its dram shop act to include persons other than those who
are engaged in the traffic of intoxicating liquors or who are licensed to sell or
give it away for profit.85 As a result, a wife whose husband had become
intoxicated and died after falling off a horse did not have a right of action
against her deceased husband's friend who supplied him with liquor.86 Courts'
acceptance of wives' suits and their desire to assist women generally did not
extend so far as to trump established male customs and marital relations.
Still, dram shop statute remedies remained available even after the turn of
the twentieth century. The Supreme Court of South Dakota ruled in 1900 that
even a divorced wife could bring an action under statute against a licensed
saloonkeeper to recover damages resulting from the sale of liquor to her
husband during coverture. 87 The saloonkeeper "render[ed] the husband wholly
incapable of performing his legal duty to support his wife and their minor
children [during marriage]. As late as 1910, the Supreme Court of Nebraska
compared the negligence of a saloonkeeper to the negligence of a railroad
company. 89 It held that $4,500 in damages would not be excessive if a train had
negligently killed a man, and consequently the amount is not excessive to
compensate a wife for the loss to intoxication of a strong and able-bodied man
capable of earning wages. 90
III. DIVORCE AS AN ALTERNATIVE
A. Incomplete Divorce: Infrequency of Separation from Bed and Board Suits
Related to Drunkenness
Wives were also able to bring temperance-related suits in court through the
legal process of separation from bed and board, or divorce a mensa et thoro.
Separation from bed and board allowed for the separation of the husband and
wife, but it did not dissolve the marriage and did not authorize remarriage. 9 In
1860, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a wife whose husband was a
drunk and failed to support her was entitled to a divorce a mensa et thoro.92
The court refrained from granting the plaintiff a complete divorce because
84. Albrecht v. People, 78 Ill. 510, 513 (1875).
85. Aden v. Cruse, 21 Ill. App. 391, 398, 394-95 (1887), aff'd, 20 N.E. 73, 73, 77 (Ill. 1889).
86. Id.
87. Nordin v. Kjos, 83 N.W. 573, 574 (S.D. 1900).
88. Id.
89. Pilkins v. Hans, 126 N.W. 864, 867-68 (Neb. 1910).
90. Id.
91. BOUVIER, supra note 9.
92. Levering v. Levering, 16 Md. 213, 216, 218 (1860).
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"public policy and public morals, alike, require that a relation so intimate and
tender should not be broken for slight or trivial causes. "93 A few cases illustrate
the success of plaintiffs. In Williams v. Goss, the Louisiana Supreme Court
granted a separation from bed and board for a wife on the grounds that her
husband was habitually intemperate, mistreated her, and became
incapacitated. 94 In De Lesdernier v. De Lesdernier, the same court granted a
wife separation from bed and board because the "defendant was an actual and
confirmed inebriate" and living together was "insupportable to the wife." 95
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in 1868 preferred to grant a
divorce a mensa et thoro (separation from bed and board) over a divorce a
vinculo matrimonii (complete divorce). 96 The court found that within the five
years prior to the wife bringing the suit, the husband was only occasionally
intemperate, did not contribute to waste, and did not mistreat or neglect his
wife. 97
Wives who did succeed in separation from bed and board suits claimed
some benefits. Plaintiff-wives could receive court orders that legally allowed
them to physically separate from their husbands, relieving them of their spousal
duties; wives could return to their family homes for support, as well as receive
custody rulings in the wives' favor.98 The Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled in
De Lesdernier that separation from bed and board even carried with it the
"separation of goods and effects," and gave the wife $1,700 for paraphernal
funds belonging to her that the husband converted to his use.99
Despite these few victories for plaintiff-wives in separation from bed and
board suits, a search for more separation from bed and board suits on the basis
of husband drunkenness yields few results. This legal process does not appear
to have enjoyed much widespread usage throughout the United States. Overall,
divorce a mensa et thoro cases on the grounds of drunkenness were rare
between 1850 and 1910.
93. Id. at 217.
94. 9 So. 750, 75 1-52 (La. 1891).
95. 14 So. 191, 192 (La. 1893).
96. St. John v. St. John, 2 Ky. Op. 599, 599 (1868).
97. Id.
98. Levering v. Levering, 16 Md. 213, 213, 218-19 (1860) (noting that the wife had left her
husband and went to her father's house prior to the lawsuit, and holding that the wife would have
custody and guardianship of their young daughter); Williams, 9 So. at 752 (ruling that the husband's
behavior was insupportable to the wife and noting that the court had appropriately adjusted the
spousal obligations); St. John, 2 Ky. Op. at 599 (observing that the husband "urged . .. . a
reconciliation and restitution of conjugal rights and relations" after his wife left him).
99. De Lesdernier, 14 So. at 191-92.
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B. Judicial Limits on Divorce: Procedural Constraints on Wives' Suits
At the end of the 1800s, courts permitted women to proceed directly
against their husbands by requesting the court to grant divorce on the ground of
habitual drunkenness. However, wives seeking complete divorce faced the
additional obstacle of having to meet a higher burden of proof than in the dram
shop statute cases. State courts were hesitant to depart from the public policy
expectation that marriage should be protected whenever possible. 0 0
Consequently, state statutes qualified wives' right to bring divorce suits and
generally dictated that drunkenness had to be shown as habitual and
insupportable to the plaintiff.0 1 In 1890, it was found that nationally,
[t]he causes more generally prevailing as ground for divorce are
adultery, cruelty, and desertion. Next in importance are drunkenness,
imprisonment, and impotence .... In many States non-support by the
husband is ground for divorce in favor of the wife; but, as she is
usually obliged to prove that she actually suffers for lack of the
necessaries of life as the result of her husband's failure to provide
them, that she does not receive them from any source, by her own
labor of otherwise, and that he is amply able to support her and
willfully refuses to do so, this remedy is practical of little value and
is seldom relied on independently of other causes.lo
Regardless, by at least the mid-nineteenth century, the concept had
emerged that divorce would allow women to separate from their intemperate
husbands. 0 3 Divorce petitions reflected in part the efforts of reformers like
Elizabeth Cady Stanton to promote the passage of liberalized divorce laws that
permitted wives to break away from their habitually drunk husbands.1 04 The
burdens of proof that the plaintiffs had to shoulder varied across states, but an
analysis of case law reveals that courts imposed greater transaction costs on
wives who attempted to bring successful divorce suits on the ground of
drunkenness.s05 Essentially, wives were expected to undertake additional legal
steps in their cases if they chose to challenge the institution of marriage. The
national trend by 1890 was that to establish a divorce suit based on habitual
drunkenness, the habitual intemperance must have continued for a definite
100. See, e.g., Levering, 16 Md. at 217 (stating that "to dissolve the marriage bond, for light or
trivial causes, is against public policy.").
101. Halls v. Cartwright, 18 La. Ann. 414, 415 (1866).
102. ROBINSON, supra note 34, at 64.
103. PEGRAM, supra note 7, at 57.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., McBee v. McBee, 29 P. 887, 889 (Or. 1892) (requiring a showing of a husband's
habitual drunkenness); Divorce From an Ex-Conductor, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1896, at 10 (showing
that presenting additional charges and evidence helped a plaintiff-wife's divorce case).
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number of years set by state.106 For the most part, wives also had to show that
the habit was contracted after marriage in order to bring the suit in the first
place. 107
In states with more lax divorce laws, the general limitation was that the
plaintiff had to prove that the husband frequently drank excessively. In Walton
v. Walton, the husband was shown to be drunk two or three weeks at a time and
was consequently "incapacitated from attending to his business " and "very
quarrelsome and irritable with the plaintiff."10 8 The Supreme Court of Kansas
in 1885 accepted the plaintiff-wife's and witnesses' testimony and held that
"where a person indulges in the practice of becoming intoxicated whenever the
temptation is presented, and the opportunity is afforded him, it may safely be
said that he is an habitual drunkard, within the meaning of the statute relating to
divorce. ,,109 The plaintiff thus achieved the requested divorce. The Appellate
Court of Illinois, Second District granted Elizabeth Richards a divorce against
her habitually drunk husband, asserting that habitual drunkenness is a ground
for divorce "because it renders the person addicted thereto unfit for the duties
of the marital relation, and disqualifies such person for properly rearing and
caring for the children born of the marriage. "I 10
Despite the aforementioned plaintiff victories, state courts appear to have
adhered strictly to the requirement of showing habitual drunkenness in divorce
cases. In contrast, the courts accepted more general testimony when dealing
with dram shop statute claims. The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed a
judgment for divorce for the plaintiff-wife in 1892 on the grounds that the
husband did not engage in "frequent repetition of excessive indulgence as to
engender a fixed habit of drunkenness." 11 The plaintiff herself had admitted
that her husband carried on his business and was sober at home.112 Judge
Graham of the San Francisco Superior Court highlighted the burden of proof,
declaring that what was determinative of habitual intemperance was not the
amount of liquor consumed but the effect of the liquor: "It must be shown that
the defendant was wholly incapacitated by his habitual addiction to drink. ,113
The judge then used this rationale to deny a divorce to plaintiff Mrs. Coover.l14
When the petitioning wife did, however, establish by her own and
witnesses' testimony that her husband was consistently drunk and did not
provide for her, courts would generally rule for divorce in favor of the wife.
This was the case in Page v. Page, in which a wife was granted a divorce based
106. ROBINSON, supra note 34, at 65-66.
107. Id.
108. Walton v. Walton, 8 P. 110, 110-12 (Kan. 1885).
109. Id. at 112.
110. Richards v. Richards, 19 I. App. 465, 466, 469 (1886).
111. McBee v. McBee, 29 P. 887, 889 (Or. 1892).
112. Id.
113. A Man May Drink, Yet Not Be Drunk, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 10, 1910, at 10.
114. Id.
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on the fact that the husband "squandered the greater part of his earnings for
drink, and had failed and refused to make suitable provision for [his wife's]
support ... [and] he had loathsome and filthy habits when drunk, and had been
guilty of personal indignities toward her while intoxicated. "" Similarly, the
Hartford Courant reported in 1909 that Cora Eddy was granted a divorce in a
Connecticut superior court on the ground of her husband 's habitual
intemperance, as he was continuously drunk for three years and she had to
work for twelve years to support herself. 116 It is important to note, however,
that the wives who were bringing legitimate suits also had to manage their
households in the absence of a providing husband. Thus, bringing a divorce suit
on the ground of drunkenness could be a rather extended, complex, and costly
affair.
Plaintiff-wives often brought additional charges or presented more
evidence with their divorce suits on the basis of her husband's habitual
drunkenness, perhaps believing that more evidence of husband misbehavior
would lead to success in court. This additional step was not particularly
necessary or helpful in dram shop statute cases. It was common by 1890 for
wives desiring divorce to allege cruelty and drunkenness together.117 This trend
was pervasive, although each claim by itself was supposedly sufficient to
achieve a divorce.118 Courts helped protect women by addressing domestic
violence in divorce cases; to prove cruelty, women may have needed to prove
"violent conduct" on the part of husbands that endangered "life, limb, or
health" or created a "reasonable fear of such danger," or conduct "which
result[ed] in such mental torture that its natural and direct effect is to injure or
endanger the physical health. "119
The following cases are illustrative of wives' tendency to bring multiple
charges of drunkenness and cruelty in divorce actions. When Emma Triepel
charged her husband with drunkenness, she also charged him with cruelty. 120
She then elaborated that her husband beat her and went to bed drunk, and that
she had to pawn all of her valuables to pay his fine for carrying concealed
weapons.121 Similarly, Louise More brought a suit in 1904 against her husband
for "cruelty, intemperance, desertion, and failure to provide" because he had
threatened to kill her, neglected to support her, and was drunk for an entire
115. 86 P. 582, 583 (1906).
116. Says Husband Remained Drunk for Three Years, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 13, 1909, at
2.
117. ROBINSON, supra note 34, at 66. See infra notes 120, 122, 123 and accompanying text.
118. ROBINSON, supra note 34, at 66.
119. Id. The courts' consideration of domestic abuse in divorce cases is likely related to the
American courts' formal repudiation of a husband's right of chastisement-his former right to
corporally punish his wife-by the 1870s. Siegel, supra note 1, at 2129.
120. Divorce From an Ex-Conducior, supra note 105, at 10.
121. Id.
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year.122 Judge Gager of the Connecticut Superior Court also granted plaintiff
Jennie Decker a divorce on the ground of habitual intemperance, likely because
the plaintiff had charged and brought evidence of both intolerable cruelty and
habitual intemperance.' 23 The wife provided strong testimony that her husband
sold furniture to obtain money for alcohol, ended up in an almshouse, and
failed to provide for their family.124
On the whole, analysis of the available case reports indicates that failure to
provide and cruelty were the more common claims in divorce cases involving
drunkenness. A court in Reno, California granted a divorce to a plaintiff-wife
based on her testimony that her physician husband became addicted to alcohol
soon after their marriage, was unable to earn a living, and physically abused
her.125 The Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled earlier in the 1887 case Mack v.
Handy that a wife could adduce proof of gambling under her divorce action in
support of the charges that her husband was habitually intemperate and
squandering money. 2 6
As implied by the value of additional claims and evidence in the divorce
cases, state courts refused to treat divorce lightly. They were highly reluctant to
deviate from the understanding of marriage as a binding and societally
instrumental institution.127 Since habitual drunkenness on the part of a husband
was clearly a violation of his duties to his wife, courts could not turn a blind
eye. However, as explained above, the courts could complicate the process. The
courts raised the burden of proof enough to make it more difficult for wives to
go through with the divorce suits they were now allowed to bring. 128
C. Divorce Suits Against Wives: Uncommon, but Also Molded by the Language
of Domesticity
Divorce suits brought by husbands against their wives on the ground of
drunkenness were rare. Yet, the courts were determined to preserve the sanctity
of marriage even in those infrequent cases. In Shutt v. Shutt, the husband sought
a divorce and alleged that his wife was often drunk and that they would engage
in occasional domestic fights.129 The Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled
against the husband, holding that it
122. Drunk Every Day in the Year, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 28, 1904, at 3.
123. Liquor Causes 3 Divorce Suits, HARTFORDCOURANT, Feb. 18, 1905, at 12.
124. Id.
125. Mrs. McKim Wins Divorce Suit, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 14, 1910, at 29.
126. Mack v. Handy, 39 La. Ann. 491, 497 (1887).
127. See ROBINSON, supra note 34, at 7 (stating that the "institution of marriage is the foundation-
stone of the social structure" and that monogamous marriage "has been cherished by the Government
and protected by its laws as the chief object of its regard").
128. See, e.g., McBee v. McBee, 22 Or. 329, 331-33 (1892); A Man May Drink, supra note 113.
129. 71 A. 1024, 1025 (Md. 1889).
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[was] not aware that it has ever been held, or even suggested, that the
habit of drunkenness ... was sufficient ground per se for a divorce [in
Maryland]. It may, no doubt, in connection with other grave offenses
against the marital relation, be considered as an element in the habit
130
and conduct of the party complained ....
Since the habitual drunkenness cause of action did not exist in Maryland at
the time, the Court of Appeals of Maryland refused to introduce a broad
interpretation of the facts and the legal standard at the expense of marriage.
Even in Michigan, where habitual drunkenness was an accepted sole cause of
action in divorce proceedings, the Supreme Court of Michigan ruled that where
a wife had been "equally industrious [as the husband] " and "frugal in the
home-keeping, " the husband could not achieve a divorce merely because his
wife engaged in "occasional intoxication."1 31 In another case, Rapp v. Rapp,
the Supreme Court of Michigan held that a husband with an occasionally
intoxicated wife who was a "competent and neat housekeeper" and
"industrious and [who] at times did washing for many people" was not entitled
to a divorce on the ground of habitual drunkenness.132 Unsurprisingly, the court
constrained the habitual drunkenness cause of action when it found that the
wife had faithfully fulfilled her household duties. The courts were then left with
no legitimate reason to tear the marriage relation apart.
Between 1850 and 1910, preserving marital relations was such an
important objective of the courts that one court, and perhaps more, even looked
beyond female domestic responsibilities to justify denying a divorce to
husbands. The St. Louis Court of Appeals of Missouri rejected a husband 's
divorce suit on the procedural issue that habitual drunkenness must last for one
year to be a statutory ground for divorce.133 The court selectively focused on
the fact that the couple had only been married for two months, despite the fact
that the wife in this case was often drunk and had actually neglected her
children and home.1 34 In Crowley v. Crowley, however, the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky granted a husband a divorce where his wife had been habitually
drunk for a number of years prior to him bringing the suit. 135 It ruled that the
"habits and disposition of the wife are such that the husband cannot longer live
with her. For the sake of the children, the mother should reform her habits." 36
When the court could not evade the divorce issue because the husband had
130. Id.
131. Meathe v. Meathe, 47 N.W. 109, 109 (Mich. 1890).
132. Rapp v. Rapp, 112 N.W. 708, 710 (Mich. 1907).
133. McCarthy v. McCarthy, 93 S.W. 317, 318 (Mo. App. Ct. 1906).
134. Id.
135. 40 S.W. 380, 380 (Ky. 1897).
136. Id.
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shown the wife 's habitual drunkenness and the wife had shirked her domestic
duties, it had few other options but to allow a divorce in favor of the husband.
IV. SHAPING DOWER TO MAINTAIN FAMILIAL STABILITY
When wives began bringing dower claims relating to husband drunkenness,
some courts were also willing to fashion interpretations of women's dower
rights to financially aid struggling wives, while maintaining enough control in
certain instances to protect male privilege. Dower, a wife's share in her
husband 's estate upon his death, was considered a "mere inchoate right [prior
to a husband 's death] . . . . [I]t has been called an expectancy . . . [and] a mere
contingent right."l37 As shown by case law of the time, a wife generally could
retain dower in her alcoholic husband's estate even if she lived separately from
him or he assigned away her rights in his drunken incapacity. The Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia held in 1901 that when a husband became a
habitual drunkard after marriage, the wife "ha[d] a right to leave him [earlier],
and live apart from him, until he fumishe[d] her indubitable evidence of
reformation . . . . [I]n doing so she in no sense forfeited her dower [after he
died]. " In an earlier case, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the
"legislature has provided but one mode whereby a married woman may
relinquish her dower in the real estate of her husband, and that is 'by their joint
deed, acknowledged and certified."'l39 The court held, therefore, that a
plaintiff-wife with a drunken husband whose guardian sold his land had not
relinquished her dower in her husband's sold estate. 140
At least one court held that the remarriage of the wife was no obstacle to
the retention of her dower right. According to a holding of the Supreme Court
of Ohio in 1887, Mrs. Olive McGill, who endured a period of living with her
habitually drunk husband, divorced said husband in California, and then
remarried, was still entitled to her initial dower in Ohio after her first husband's
death. 14 1 Aligning with Ohio state precedent, Judge Dickman noted that dower
is permitted not only to the widow "who was the wife of the person dying at the
time of his death . . . [but also to] a woman who, under the act of 1824
concerning divorce, had obtained divorce a vinculo matrimonii from her
husband for his misconduct [and remarried]."l42 Mrs. McGill, who herself was
remarried, had alleged and shown with proof that her ex-husband had been
habitually intemperate for more than three years. 143 She thus met part of the
137. STEWART, supra note 35, at 390.
138. Stuart v. Neely, 40 S.E. 441, 443 (W. Va. 1901).
139. Rannells v. Gerner, 80 Mo. 474, 483 (1883) (citing Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 669, 2197).
140. Id. at 478, 483.
141. McGill v. Deming, 44 Ohio St. 645, 652 (1887).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 655.
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standard for grounds for divorce under the California statute. 144 She eventually
obtained a full divorce; the court found that her first husband 's cruelty and
habitual intemperance were sufficient aggression to entitle her, a divorced
widow, to dower in his lands.1 45
One court was willing to adopt an even broader view of dower as an
enduring right by granting dower to the wife immediately upon divorce. It
chose not to limit the vesting of the right to after the drunken husband's death,
holding that the court retained discretion in the matter. In Tatro v. Tatro, the
Supreme Court of Nebraska held that, according to state statute, the court could
award the divorced wife dower in the lands of the misbehaving husband as a
form of alimony.146 The court decided that the right to dower was not
contingent upon the death of the husband but accrued immediately upon the
rendition of the divorce decree. 147
Like in the divorce cases, however, some courts attempted to keep control
over dower remedies. For example, once granted her dower, the wife in Tatro
was no longer permitted to bring any claims for additional alimony or property
from her divorced drunken husband.148 This judicial stance reflects the reality
that the courts permitted a wife to bring a suit in her own name and were
practical enough to afford a suffering wife the necessary finances, yet some
courts still attempted to protect male privilege. The Supreme Court of Iowa
ruled for the plaintiff-wife in Jolly v. Jolly under a similar rationale. The
husband became intemperate within the seven years leading up to the case, and
the couple was granted a divorce.1 49 The court affirmed that the wife should be
awarded alimony as a specific portion of the land in fee and that her dower in
the remaining portion of her estate was to be extinguished.150 Thus, courts
realized that the principles behind dower had to be modified in some cases to
keep in line with the gender norm. They took care to rein in their judgments so
as to limit the potential of these judgments to excessively expand women's
property rights.
CONCLUSION: SUMMARY AND FURTHER RESEARCH
This Note has explored wives' autonomy in filing temperance-related
lawsuits and the types of remedies available to these women in a strictly
gendered American society between 1850 and 1910. These lawsuits were
particularly notable because the common law rule of coverture in effect at the
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 25 N.W. 571, 572 (Neb. 1885).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Jolly v. Jolly, 1 Clarke 9, 9-10 (Iowa 1855).
150. Id. at il.
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time held that a woman's legal existence was suspended during marriage.' 5 '
Courts, in addition, were reluctant to intervene in family matters and to blame
the husbands, who were legally and societally expected to assume legal and
financial responsibility for their wives. While scholars have studied the courts'
responses to husband chastisement of wives and found that men enjoyed
immunities from prosecution, they have not fully looked into the forms of relief
afforded to women with drunken husbands at the state and local levels during
this period. As discussed earlier, male addiction to alcohol became a pressing
problem for families in the United States in the 1800s. Due to domestic
responsibilities and social culture, women who depended on their husbands as
the family breadwinners were the ones who bore the burden of this difficulty.
American courts grew willing to provide legal remedies to help support these
financially troubled wives and their children.
This Note investigates the extent to which wives, subject to gendered
societal duties, were able to address in court their alcoholic husbands'
wastefulness and inability to earn wages. Without comprehensive federal or
state reform programs in place, wives turned to state and local courts for relief
in their times of financial distress. By bringing claims under dram shop statutes
in their own names, wives were able to hold third-party alcohol sellers liable
for the incapacity of their drunken husbands. Courts usually granted the wives
actual and exemplary damages in these suits, with certain limits.
Wives also pursued other civil remedies. The judiciary imposed a higher
burden of proof in divorce a vinculo matrimonii (complete divorce) cases
brought on the ground of habitual drunkenness in order to reduce wives'
chances of winning. The courts perceived such complete divorce suits as posing
a threat to the marriage institution and male privilege. Divorce suits were
difficult to bring, but drunkenness claims could be successfully combined with
cruelty and other causes of action for divorce. Though rare, even divorce a
mensa et thoro suits were less questioned by the courts because separation from
bed and board did not require the courts to fully end a marriage. The wife and
husband could still choose to resume their relationship.152 Another method of
relief employed by the courts was the shaping of dower rights. Even a woman
with a drunken husband who then became divorced and remarried could
retrieve promised property in the drunken husband's estate. Courts fashioned
these kinds of remedies for wives in response to the growing number of suits
women brought in their own names. In doing so, the courts were attempting to
balance providing financial assistance with preserving gendered duties in the
home.
Further research is warranted into the ties between the Married Women's
Property Acts and wives' decisions to bring lawsuits during the early
151. See supra notes 2-4 for more information on the common law of coverture.
152. See supra note 10 for a definition of divorce a mensa et thoro.
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temperance movement. Numerous states in the mid-nineteenth century passed
these Acts, which granted married women the right to own property when they
were previously prohibited from doing so under coverture-a few of them as
early as the 1840s. 153 There seems to be a logical connection between the
passage of the Acts and women's attempts in court to defend their rights to
financial support and to test their available legal options.1 54 The lack of legal
uniformity among the states and the absence of a federal law implementing
women's property and contractual rights invite legal historians to take a closer
look at the origins and effects of the Married Women's Property Acts. The
cases explored here do not directly mention the Acts, but it cannot be ignored
that their passage and the early temperance movement were occurring during
relatively the same time period in the United States.
While this Note has explored how wives could seek out civil remedies
between 1850 and 1910, one wonders about the kinds of injunctive relief
available to wives and enforceable during the period. While temporary
restraining orders and other such equitable remedies may be commonplace
today, courts in the temperance context mostly seemed to focus on monetary
remedies when dealing with women with drunken husbands. As discussed,
dram shop liability and dower rights afforded women the money or property
necessary to support their families, while divorce did invoke more of an
injunctive regime. It is possible that due to coverture and the gendered spheres
of responsibility, courts generally frowned upon non-monetary relief that
involved intruding upon male prerogative. Thus, wives may have determined it
was in their best interests to proceed otherwise. Regardless, research into what
limited forms of injunctive relief existed for wives in the nineteenth century
could fortify knowledge of the origins of equitable relief for domestic issues.
The early temperance effort was motivated by wives principally attempting
to stabilize their households, asking courts to maneuver between gender
153. See KHAN, supra note 5, at 162-69 (discussing coverture; the status of married women, who
could not control or enjoy their property, in the eighteenth century; and the Married Women's Property
Acts that gave property rights to married women); Norton, supra note 2, at 26 (describing how women
were prohibited under coverture from managing their own property). Professor Zorina Khan notes,
however, that there were Married Women's Property Acts with "caveats such as the
requirement that husbands were irresponsible, imprisoned or incapacitated, or appointed as trustees
for their wives." KHAN, supra note 5, at 168. States with such Married Women's Property
Acts included Alabama, 1849; Arkansas, 1875; Connecticut, 1849, 1853, 1875; Delaware, 1865,
1873; Florida, 1881; Georgia, 1873; Idaho (no date); Illinois, 1874; Indiana, 1853, 1857, 1861;
Kentucky, 1843, 1873; Louisiana, 1866; Maine, 1821; Massachusetts, 1835; Michigan, 1846;
Minnesota, 1866; Mississippi, 1839; Missouri, 1865; Nebraska, 1881; New Hampshire, 1842,
1846; North Carolina, 1868, 1872, 1873; Ohio, 1868; Oregon, 1857; Pennsylvania, 1718, 1855,
1872; Rhode Island, 1880; Tennessee, 1835, 1858; Texas, 1865; Vermont, 1862, 1881; Virginia,
1876, 1877; West Virginia, 1868; and Wisconsin, 1850, 1878. Id. at 167-68 (listing some
states that passed Married Women's Property Acts, albeit with caveats, in the
mid-1800s).
154. See Megan Benson, Fisher v. Allen: The Southern Origins of the Married Women's
Property Acts, 6 J. S. LEGAL HIST. 97 (1998) (describing Elizabeth Allen's court case brought on
the basis of the Mississippi Married Women's Property Act).
166 [Vol. 27:1
2015] Wives' Lawsuits Addressing Husband Drunkenness 167
barriers to provide financial relief. As the temperance movement blossomed
into a larger statement on women's rights after 1900, it focused on moving the
issue up to the federal level-a trajectory heavily explored by scholars. The
early temperance movement slowly transformed in the twentieth century into
Prohibition, an undertaking initially spearheaded by women and that eventually
gained political momentum. Prohibition was aimed at inducing a nationwide
change in social behavior. The initial American cases addressing temperance
include the unassuming yet notable civil lawsuits brought by wives for the
immediate recovery of damages, divorce, and dower-remarkable suits because
plaintiff-wives were the ones seeking remedies that were admittedly still
shaped to accommodate male privilege.

